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MIGRATION AS REPARATION: CLIMATE
CHANGE AND THE DISRUPTION OF
BORDERS
Carmen G. Gonzalez*

INTRODUCTION
Climate-fueled disasters are displacing record numbers of
people all over the world.' According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), climate change is anticipated to displace anywhere from 25 million to 1 billion people by 2050.2 The
precise number of climate-displaced persons is difficult to predict
because climate change amplifies pre-existing social, economic,
environmental, and political vulnerabilities and is rarely the exclusive driver of migration. 3
* Morris I. Leibman Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
Professor Emerita, Seattle University School of Law. This article is adapted from an
article titled Racial Capitalism, Climate Justice and Climate Displacement to be published in the Ofiati Socio-Legal Series. The author would like to thank Maria Pab6n
for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. See Todd Miller, The United States is Polluting the World and Locking Refugees Out, THE NATION (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/
archive/the-united-states-is-polluting-the-world-and-locking-refugees-out/; see Forced
2019),
2,
(Dec.
OXFAM
Displacement,
Climate-fueled
Home:
from
https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620914/mb-climatedisplacement-cop25-021219-en.pdf.
2. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM), IOM OUTLOOK ON
MIGRATION, ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE 38 (2014), https://publications.

iom.int/system/files/pdf/mecc outlook.pdf.
3. See id. (pointing out that the extent of migration will depend on many factors,
including the rate of climate change, the adaptation measures adopted, and the
many social, economic, and political factors that drive the decision to move). As the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) observes, "[c]limate change will
amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems. Risks
are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and
communities in countries at all levels of development." Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of
Working Groups I, II, and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, at 13 (Rajendra K. Pachauri and Leo Meyer eds. 2014),
https://ar5-syr.ipcc.ch/ipcc/ipcc/resources/pdfIPCCSynthesisReport.pdf.
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Climate change is an injustice rather than a misfortune.
Caused primarily by the world's most affluent populations, climate change wreaks havoc first and foremost on the states and
peoples who contributed least to the problem. 4 The United States,
the European Union, China, Russia, and Japan are responsible
for seventy percent of global carbon dioxide emissions between
1751 and 2017.' However, the states and peoples who are most
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change generated less than
one percent of global emissions.6 Certain states that are currently
high emitters, such as India and Brazil, are relatively minor historic contributors to climate change. 7 This article will focus on the
legal and moral responsibility to climate-displaced persons of the
United States and other high-emitting states that contribued disproportionately to the climate crisis.
Climate change is occurring at a time of rising economic inequality and escalating racial tensions. According to a report published in 2020 by the United Nations Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, economic inequality has grown significantly
since 1990 in most affluent countries and in many middle-income
countries, including China and India. 8 As the gap between the
rich and the poor widens, authoritarian leaders and right-wing
social movements increasingly blame immigrants and racial, ethnic, and religious minorities for social and economic problems, not
only in the United States and across much of Europe, but also in
China, India, and Brazil. 9 The result is mounting state and vigi-

4. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Energy Poverty and the Environment, in
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AND POVERTY 113, 116-119 (Lakshman Guruswamy, ed.

2016) (discussing the disproportionate contribution to climate change by affluent
countries and the resulting legal and moral obligations to take the lead in addressing
the problem).
5. See Hannah Ritchie & Max Roser, C02 and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Summary, OUR WORLD IN DATA (2017, revised 2019), https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-

other-greenhouse-gas-emissions.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. U.N. Dep't of Int'l Econ. & Soc. Aff. (UNDESA), World Soc. Rep. 2020: Inequality in a Rapidly Changing World, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/372, at 3 (2020).
9. See HOWARD WINANT, Preface: New Racial Studies and Global Raciality, in
GLOBAL RAcIALITY: EMPIRE, POSTCOLONIALITY, AND DECOLONIALITY viii-ix (Paola

Bacchetta et al. eds, 2019); see generally, Max Bergmann et al., The Rise of Far-Right
Populism Threatens Global Democracy and Security, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS (Nov. 2, 2018, 9:04 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
security/news/2018/1 1/02/460498/rise-far-right-populism-threatens-globaldemocracy-security/; Zachary Basu, It's Not Just the U.S.: Europe's Growing Anti-
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lante violence against minority populations, ongoing dispossession of Indigenous peoples, and mass detention and deportation of
immigrants. 10

Despite the deeply racialized nature of debates over migration, much of the scholarship on climate displacement sidesteps
the role of race and racism in the climate crisis. This article
breaks new ground by examining the racial dimensions of the
climate crisis and its relationship to the fossil fuel-driven capitalist world economy (carbon capitalism). Using as an example the
surge of migrants to the United States from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras," the article examines the complex ways
that climate change and U.S. interventions have upended the
lives and livelihoods of the region's inhabitants. The article then
applies the insights from this analysis to the emerging legal and
policy approaches to climate displacement.
The article proceeds in three parts. Part I defines key terms
and concepts, including race, racialization, and racial capitalism.
Part II applies these concepts to the life cycle of carbon capitalism
and the ongoing displacement of Central Americans. Part III examines and critiques the emerging legal frameworks that address
climate displacement, and proposes migration as a form of reparation for the ravages of carbon capitalism. In so doing, the article
fills a gap in the climate change literature by integrating climate
displacement into the larger debates over racial and postcolonial
justice.
The article argues that affluent countries (the Global North)
have an obligation to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, provide adaptation assistance to climate-vulnerable countries, and
provide reparations to climate-displaced persons, including the
equitable sharing of responsibility for relocation and resettle-

Immigration Backlash, AxIOS (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.axios.com/migrationdrives-populist-surge-across-europe-8aI6ec3c-Oc4c-4eOe-8f63-c4cff66b4936.html.
10. See PAOLA BACCHETTA ET AL., INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL RAcIALITY: EMPIRE,
POSTCOLONIALITY, AND DECOLONIALITY, IN GLOBAL RAcIALITY: EMPIRE, POSTCOLONIALITY, AND DECOLONIALITY 2 (Paola Bacchetta et al. eds., 2019); Rana
Ayyub, Narendra Modi Looks the Other Way as New Delhi Burns, TIME
(Feb. 28, 2020), https://time.com/5791759/narendra-modi-india-delhi-riots-violence-

muslim/?fbclid=IwAR2PzPavnIN9ZXVrSpcujf1RtV4Q30BtNOOw2UOR8X3eJUttrQj
QU4E9Ys.
11. See Amelia Cheatham, Backgrounder: Central America's Turbulent Northern
Triangle, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/central-americas-turbulent-northern-triangle.
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ment. This obligation arises from their disproportionate historic
and current contribution to climate change as well as their role in
exacerbating climate vulnerability through colonial and postcolonial military, economic, and political interventions that increased poverty and inequality in much of Asia, Africa, Latin
America, and the Pacific (the Global South).
II. RACIAL CAPITALISM AND NATURE: FRAMING THE
ISSUES
Capitalism is not simply a world-economy, but also a worldecology that transforms human activity into commodified labor
power, land into private property, and nature into an external object to be harnessed for the accumulation of capital." Capitalism
creates a divide between humanity and nature, and deploys science and technology in an endless quest for cheap energy, cheap
food, cheap raw materials, and cheap labor power.1 3 Capitalism
also creates racialized distinctions between superior and inferior
humans; these distinctions were developed to justify the genocide
of indigenous peoples, the enslavement of Africans, and the colonial and post-colonial domination of Asia, Africa, and the Americas.

14

Political theorist Cedric Robinson coined the term racial capitalism to describe the symbiotic relationship between racism and
capitalism. 15 He argued that capitalism emerged from European
feudal societies thoroughly infused with racial hierarchies, and
then evolved into a world system that transformed regional and
cultural differences into racial forms of domination.16
This article defines racism as the subordination and objectification of human beings based on physical characteristics (such

12. See JASON W. MOORE, The Rise of Cheap Nature, in ANTHROPOCENE OR
CAPITALOCENE? NATURE, HISTORY, AND CRISIS OF CAPITALISM 78, 85-87 (Jason E.
Moore, ed., 2016).
13. See id. at 86-87, 101-102, 112; JASON MOORE, CAPITALISM IN THE WEB OF LIFE
128 (2015).
14. See JOHN BELLAMY FOSTER & BRETT CLARK, THE ROBBERY OF NATURE:
CAPITALISM AND THE ECOLOGICAL RIFT 48-49 (2020); see JASON MOORE, supra note
12, at 79; see GARGI BHATTACHARYYA, RETHINKING RACIAL CAPITALISM: QUESTIONS
OF REPRODUCTION AND SURvIVAL 71-80 (2018).
15. See CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK
RADICAL TRADITION 2 (2000).
16. See id. at 26-27, 66-68 (discussing the racialization of Slavs, Tartars, Muslims,
Africans, and Asians).
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as skin color) as well as ethnicity, indigeneity, culture, language,
religion, geographic location, immigration status, and geographic
origin. Racialization is the process through which human beings
are classified as superior or inferior according to distinct racial
indicators adopted in a particular region or nation at a particular
time.1 8 Race is socially constructed rather than phenotypically
predetermined; who is racialized and the narrative accompanying
that racialization varies significantly across place and time based
on changing economic and political conditions. 19 For example,
some groups that are currently deemed White (such as Jews and
the Irish) have a long history of being classified as non-White. 0
Conversely, many light-skinned Arabs and Muslims who were
once considered White are currently racialized as non-White.2 1
Euro-American elites deployed racial hierarchies to maintain
control over specific populations and facilitate the appropriation
of their labor, lands, and natural wealth. In the U.S., for example,
the key function of anti-Black racism was labor exploitation."
When slavery was abolished, other mechanisms of exploitation
and control emerged, including share-cropping, convict-leasing,
debt peonage, lynching, and segregation in low-wage occupations
and industries.2 3 By contrast, the underlying goal of anti-Native
racism was the physical eradication or forced assimilation of Indigenous peoples in order to seize their lands. Consequently,
settler-colonial states like the U.S., Australia, and Canada sought
to dissolve Indigenous nations and eliminate Indigenous land

17. See generally Ramon Grosfoguel, What is Racism?, 22 J. WORLD-SYs. RES. 9
(2016) (adopting a similarly expansive definition of racism).
18. See Ramon Grosfoguel et al., 'Racism," Intersectionality, and Migration Studies: Framing Some TheoreticalReflections, 22 IDENTITIES: GLOBAL STUD. IN CULTURE
AND POWER 1, 3 (2014).
19. See Adolph Reed. Jr., Marx, Race, and Neoliberalism, 22 NEW LAB. F. 49, 50
(2013).
20. See generally KAREN BRODKIN, How JEWS BECAME WHITE FOLKS AND WHAT
THAT SAYS ABOUT RACE IN AMERICA (1998); see generally NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE
IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995).
21. See generally Craig Considine, The Racializationof Islam in the United States:
Islamophobia, Hate Crimes, and "Flying While Brown," 8 RELIGIONS 1 (2017).
22. See PATRICK WOLFE, TRACES OF HISTORY: ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF RACE
2-5 (2016).
23. See id at.75-93; SASKIA SASSEN, EXPULSIONS: BRUTALITY AND COMPLEXITY IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 68 (2014); see generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY
ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR
TO WORLD WAR 11 (2009).
24. See WOLFE, supra note 22, at 33.
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claims through genocide, destruction of Indigenous culture, religious conversion, child abduction and re-education in boarding
schools, and the conversion of Native title into individuallyowned, alienable parcels of land.15
Finally, the U.S. racialized Latinos and Latinas in order to
justify the relentless expansion of White settlers into Mexico,
Central America, and the Caribbean and the relegation to second
class status of these regions' inhabitants. 6 For example, under
the banner of Manifest Destiny (the inevitability of EuroAmerican expansion and domination of supposedly inferior races,
including Latin Americans), the U.S. annexed Texas in 1845,
waged war against Mexico, and acquired half of Mexico's territory
pursuant to the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (including the
present-day states of California, New Mexico, Nevada, and parts
of Arizona and Utah)." The wealth extracted from these territories through the dispossession of Mexican landowners and the
exploitation of Mexican labor contributed significantly to U.S.
prosperity in the twentieth century. In Central America and the
Caribbean, racism and Manifest Destiny were likewise invoked to
support armed interventions by White settlers and countless invasions and occupations by the U.S. military that enabled U.S.
banks and corporations to dominate the key industries of the region by the early decades of the twentieth century. 29 "As U.S.owned plantations spread rapidly into Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico,

25. PATRICK WOLFE, TRACES OF HISTORY: ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF RACE 33
(2016). In the U.S., Indian tribes were recognized as sovereign nations capable of entering into treaties with the United States (until 1871), but they were also regarded
as a racially distinct, inferior group. See LAURA E. G6MEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE
MAKING OF THE MEXICAN RACE 1 (2nd ed. 2018); see generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS,
THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF
CONQUEST (1990) (discussing the ideologies that justified the conquest of indigenous
peoples). For an analysis of the contemporary tension between the status of tribes as
sovereign nations and racialized groups, see Gloria Valencia-Weber, Racial Equality:
Old and New Strains and American Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333 (2004); see
Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1371 (2002).
26. See JUAN J. GONZALEZ, HARVEST OF EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF LATINOS IN
AMERICA 28-29 (Revised ed. 2011); see PAUL FRYMER, BUILDING AN AMERICAN
EMPIRE: THE ERA OF TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL EXPANSION 172-219 (2017).
27. See GONZALEZ, supra note 26, at 29-30, 41-44; see also GOMEZ, supra note 25,
at 4 (describing Manifest Destiny as "a cluster of ideas that relied on racism to justify
a war of aggression against Mexico").
28. See GONZALEZ, supra note 26, at 44-47.
29. See id. at 47-59.
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the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Guatemala, millions of
peasants were displaced from their lands."30
Racial hierarchies are not relics of a bygone era. Latinos and
Latinas, for example, continue to be portrayed in the U.S. media
as racially subordinate, criminal, violent, uncivilized, foreign, and
a menace to the "American way of life."3 1 Racial hierarchies structure the national and international division of labor, relegating
those constructed as non-White to the most precarious, dangerous, and least desirable forms of employment.3 2 They also intersect with gender hierarchies, consigning women to domestic labor
(such as cooking, cleaning, and raising children)3 3 and subjecting
racialized poor women to additional forms of exploitation including trafficking, coerced sex work, and the low-paid domestic and
care work that facilitates the participation of more privileged
women in elite labor markets. 34 Finally, racial hierarchies influence which immigrants are welcomed with open arms and which
immigrants are excluded, detained, and deported. 5

-

While racial constructs are applied to human bodies, racialized exclusion is also mapped onto space in the form of stigmatized geographic locations - including reservations, ghettos, export-processing zones, extractive zones, and the Third World
where the land and the people have been rendered expendable

30. JUAN J. GONZALEZ, HARVEST OF EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF LATINOS IN AMERICA
59 (Revised ed. 2011).
31. See G6MEZ, supra note 25, at 187-188; see Jost A. COBAS ET AL., Introduction:
HistoricalBackground and Current Forms, in HoW THE UNITED STATES RACIALIZES
LATINOS: WHITE HEGEMONY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 1, 7-8 (Jos6 A. Cobas et al. eds.
2009).
32. See BHATTACHARYYA, supra note 14, at 107-108; see Daniel Faber, Global Capitalism, Reactionary Neoliberalism, and the Deepening of Environmental Injustices,
29 CAPITALISM, NATURE, SOCIALISM 8, 14 (2018); see Nancy Fraser, Expropriation
and Exploitation in Racialized Capitalism:A Reply to Michael Dawson, 3 CRITICAL
HIST. STUD. 163, 175 (2016).
33. See BHATTACHARYYA, supra note 14, at 40.
34. See id. at 47; BACCHETTA ET AL., supra note 10, at 2-3.
35. See Ibram X. Kendi, The Day "Shithole"Entered the PresidentialLexicon, THE
ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/
shithole-countries/580054/ (analyzing President Trump's hostility to immigrants
from Haiti, El Salvador, and an assortment of African countries); see Leighton Akio

Woodhouse, Trump's "Shithole Countries" Remark Is at the Center of a Lawsuit to
Reinstate Protections for Immigrants, THE INTERCEPT (June 28, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2018/06/28/trump-tps-shithole-countries-lawsuit/ (discussing
the lawsuit challenging the Trump administration's revocation of relief from deportation for certain immigrants on the basis of racism).
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and disposable.3 6 Indeed, the current stage of racial capitalism is
marked by growing expendability as people are expelled from
gainful employment by contracting global labor markets, expelled from society through mass incarceration, 38 and displaced
from their homes in record numbers, not only by poverty and conflict, but also by extreme weather events triggered by climate
change (such as hurricanes, drought, and floods) as well as the
degradation of air, land and water. 39 Racialization renders exclusion and expulsion morally and legally acceptable because much
of the burden is borne by "surplus" people and places. 0 The following section examines climate change through a racial capitalist lens.
III. RACIAL CAPITALISM AND CLIMATE CHANGE
An analysis of climate change through the framework of racial capitalism reveals that the domination of nature and the dispossession and exploitation of racialized human beings are deeply
inter-connected. While most analyses of climate change focus on
the catastrophic consequences of greenhouse gas emissions, Part
A of this section looks at the life cycle of fossil fuels and its impact
on stigmatized persons and places from cradle to grave. Part B
uses Central America as a case study to illustrate the ways in
which racism, capitalism, and climate change intersect to destroy
lives and livelihoods.
A. THE LIFE CYCLE OF CARBON CAPITALISM

Carbon capitalism has produced racialized exclusion at every
stage of its life cycle. First, the Industrial Revolution, which
launched the age of fossil fuels, was made possible by the colonization of the Americas, the genocide of approximately 50 million
indigenous peoples, and the abduction and enslavement of Africans.4 1 "Plantation agriculture and cotton in particular were key
36. See Levi Gahman & Elise Hjalmarson, Border Imperialism, Racial Capitalism,
and Geographies of Deracination, 18 ACME: INT'L J. FOR CRITICAL GEOGRAPHIES
107, 115 (2019); Laura Pulido, Flint, Environmental Racism, and Racial Capitalism,
27 CAPITALISM, NATURE, SOCIALISM 1, 8 (2016).
37. See BHATTACHARYYA, supra note 14, at 63, 122-123.
38. See SASSEN, supra note 23, at 63-75.

39. See id. at. 149-210.
40. See Pulido, supra note 36, at 8.
41. See KATRHYN YUSOF, A BILLION BLACK ANTHROPOCENES OR NOT 14-16, 29-33

(2019); see Simon L. Lewis & Mark A. Maslin, Defining the Anthropocene, 519
NATURE 171, 175-177 (2015) (proposing 1610 as the beginning of the Anthropocene,
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to the emergence of the industrial power of England first and
quickly much of the rest of Europe."" The slave plantation colonies of the Americas supplied food, energy, industrial inputs, and
markets for British manufactured goods.13 Between 1600 and
1800, slaves in the Americas comprised less than one percent of
the world's population, but produced the commodities that dominated world trade."
Second, the "slow violence" inflicted by the fossil fuel industry on racialized and poor communities all over the world remains
a defining feature of contemporary capitalism.4 ' From petroleum
development by Chevron/Texaco in Ecuador to Cancer Alley in
Louisiana, the extraction, processing, transportation, refining,
and combustion of fossil fuels has placed disproportionate environmental burdens on racialized communities in both affluent
and poor countries. These burdens include pervasive contamination of land, air, and water; loss of subsistence fishing and hunting rights; eviction from ancestral lands; fires, explosions, and industrial accidents; violation of indigenous treaty rights and land
ethics; and exposure to toxic chemicals.4 6
Third, fossil fuel reserves are concentrated in particular
countries and regions, such as the Middle East, that have been
the contemporary era where humans dictate the future of the planet, due to the significant environmental impacts of the deaths of 50 million indigenous peoples, including the collapse of farming, the rebounding of forests, and the resulting steep decline in atmospheric carbon dioxide levels); see SIMON L. LEWIS & MARK A. MASLIN,

THE HUMAN PLANET 326-327 (2018) ("If the Anthropocene is pinned to the Columbian Exchange, the deaths of 50 million people, and the beginnings of the modern
world, then it is a deeply uncomfortable story of colonialism, slavery and the birth of
the profit-driven capitalist mode of living being intrinsically linked to long-term
planetary environmental change").
42. Simon Dalby, Environmental Geopolitics in the Twenty-First Century, 39
ALTERNATIVES: GLOBAL, LOCAL, POLITICAL 3, 6 (2014).
43. See YUSOF, supra note 41, at 40-41; see LEWIS & MASLIN, supra note 41, at
193-194; see ROBIN BLACKBURN, THE MAKING OF THE NEW WORLD SLAVERY 375
(1997); see ERIC WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY 51-85 (1994); see Heather Da-

vis & Zoe Todd, On the Importance of a Date, or Decolonizing the Anthropocene, 16
ACME: ACME: INT'L J. FOR CRITICAL GEOGRAPHIES 761, 770-772 (2017).
44. SVEN BECKERT, EMPIRE OF COTTON: A GLOBAL HISTORY 21 (2015).
45. See ROB NIXON, SLOW VIOLENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR
68-102 (2013).
46. See NAOMI KLEIN, THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING: CAPITALISM VS THE CLIMATE
302-334 (2014); BRIAN C. BLACK, CRUDE REALITY 172-178 (2012); see JEANETTE

WOLFLEY, Mni Wiconi, Tribal Sovereignty, and Treaty Rights: Lessons from the Dakota Access Pipeline, in ENERGY JUSTICE: U.S. AND INT'L PERSPECTIVES 141-165

(Raya Salter et al. eds. 2018).
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repeatedly invaded, occupied, and exploited. 4 ' The bloody resource wars instigated by Europe and the United States and the
resulting death and displacement of racialized Arab and Muslim
populations are among the cruelest manifestations of carbon capitalism.4 8 Furthermore, when persons displaced by these conflicts
seek refuge in the Global North, they are often branded as potential terrorists and subjected to restrictive border controls, including the notorious "Muslim ban" on travel to the U.S. from certain
predominantly Muslim countries.4 9
Fourth, the world's most climate-vulnerable people are overwhelmingly persons classified as non-White.5 0 They inhabit geographic locations (such as the small island states, low-lying
coastal zones, and agriculture-dependent nations) disproportionately exposed to drought, desertification, hurricanes, floods, and
rising sea levels." In addition, they have been rendered socially
and economically vulnerable to climate change by the North's
economic, political, and military interventions.5 2 The North's "under-development" of the Global South during the colonial and
postcolonial era, described so clearly in the works of Walter Rodney"3 and Eduardo Galeano 5 has been intensified by decades of
neoliberal economic reforms imposed initially by the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and later through
regional and multilateral trade agreements and bilateral invest47. BRIAN C. BLACK, CRUDE REALITY 134-147, 183-198 (2012).
48. See generally Naomi Klein, Let Them Drown: The Violence of Othering in a
Warming World, 11 LONDON REV. BOOKS 1 (2016) https://www.Irb.co.uk/thepaper/v38/n1/naomi-klein/let-them-drown; MICHAEL T. KLARE, BLOOD AND OIL: THE
DANGERS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA'S GROWING DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED
PETROLEUM (2004).
49. See Adam Liptak and Michael D. Shear, Trump's Travel Ban is Upheld by Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/us/
politics/supreme-court-trump-travel-ban.html; see Andrew Telford, A Threat to Cli-

mate-Secure European Futures? Exploring Racial Logics and Climate-Induced Migration in US and EU Climate Security Discourses, 96 GEOFORUM 268, 268-277
(2018).
50. See Pulido, supra note 36, at 117-118; see HAAS INSTITUTE, MOVING TARGETS:
AN ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL FORCED MIGRATION 28-31 (2017), https://belonging.
berkeley.edu/moving-targets-analysis-global-forced-migration.
51. See RUCHI ANAND, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A NORTHSOUTH DIMENSION 35-39 (2004).
52. See HAAS INSTITUTE, supra note 50.
53. See generally WALTER RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA
(1972).
54. See generally EDURADO GALEANO, OPEN VEINS OF LATIN AMERICA: FIVE
CENTURIES OF THE PILLAGE OF A CONTINENT (1971).
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ment treaties.5 5 These reforms increased poverty; reduced access
to health care, education, and other social services; undermined
the development of climate-resilient urban and rural infrastructure; created mass displacement; and deprived states and communities of the resources necessary for climate adaptation and
disaster response and recovery. 56
Fifth, climate change itself exacerbates poverty and inequality. A Stanford University study published in 2019 concluded that
climate change has enhanced economic output in affluent countries (such as Norway and Sweden) while depressing economic
output in poorer countries (such as Nigeria and India). 57 As a recent U.N. report confirms, "[r]ising temperatures have adversely
affected economic growth in countries located in the tropics,
which tend to be poorer than countries located in more temperate
climate zones. They have made the world's poorest countries
"158
poorer.
Finally, racialized migrants fleeing climate change, poverty,
and conflict continue to face death, detention, and deportation
when they attempt to cross the militarized borders of the Global
North. 59 The U.S. government has portrayed Central Americans
seeking refuge in the United States as criminals, separated migrant children from their parents, and confined nearly 70,000

55. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Environmental Justice, Human Rights, and the
Global South, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 151, 167-172 (2015); see generally JOHN
LINARELLI ET AL., THE MISERY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONFRONTATIONS

WITH

INJUSTICE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2018).
56. See JOHN LINARELLI ET AL., supra note 55, at. 11-17; see HAAS INSTITUTE, supra note 50, at 29-30; see Michael Thomson et al., Structural Adjustment Pro-

grammes Adversely Affect Vulnerable Populations:A Systematic-NarrativeReview of
Their Effect on Child and Maternal Health, 13 PUB. HEALTH REV. 1, 1-18 (2017); see
Myanna Lahsen, et al., Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability to Global Environmental Change: Challenges and Pathways for an Action-Oriented Research Agenda
for Middle-Income and Low-Income Countries, 2 CURRENT OPINION ENVTL.
SUSTAINABILITY 364, 364-374 (2010).

57. See generally Noah S. Diffenbaugh & Marshall Burke, Global Warming Has
Increased Global Economic Inequality, 116 PROc. NAT'L AcAD. ScI. 9808 (2019),
https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/116/20/9808.full.pdf.
58. U.N. Dep't of Int'l Econ. & Soc. Aff. (UNDESA), World Soc. Rep. 2020: Inequality in a Rapidly Changing World, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/372, at 7 (2020).
59. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Climate Justice and Climate Displacement: Evaluating
the Emerging Legal and Policy Responses, 36 WIS. INT'L L. J. 366, 367-369, 381
(2019).
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children in detention centers, often in kennel-like, ice-cold cells.6 0
European states are adopting increasingly draconian methods to
prevent the entry of African and Middle Eastern migrants, such
as increasing border surveillance, prosecuting people who assist
asylum seekers, and shutting down search-and-rescue operations
by non-governmental organizations in the Mediterranean. 61 As a
result of these policies, more than 20,000 migrants have died attempting to cross the Mediterranean since 2014,62 as smugglers
select more dangerous routes and less sea-worthy vessels to avoid
detection.6 3 Finally, Australia continues to indefinitely detain migrants and refugees in offshore processing centers located in Nauru and on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea under conditions
that Amnesty International has denounced as "a human rights
catastrophe."6

4

60. See Bart Jansen & Alan Gomez, President Trump Calls CaravanImmigrants
'Stone Cold Criminals.' Here's What We Know, USA TODAY (Nov. 26, 2018)
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/11/26/president-trump-migrant-caravancriminals/2112846002/; see Elliot Hannon, The US Detaineda Record 69,550 Migrant
Children this Year, SLATE, (Nov. 12, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019
/11/u-s-detained-record-migrant-children-separated-parents-2019.html; see UN says
US must stop separating migrant children from parents, THE GUARDIAN
(June 5, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jun/05/un-says-us-muststop-separating-migrant-children-from-parents; see Edwin Delgado, Trump Administration Still Separating Families at Border, Advocates Say (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/feb/12/trump-el-paso-family-separationsmigrants-immigration; see generally STEPHANIE J. NAWYN, Refugees in the United
States and

the

Politics of Crisis, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MIGRATION CRISES

163-180 (Cecilia Menjivar et al. eds. 2019).
61. See generally Telford, supra note 49; Encarnaci6n Guti6rrez Rodriguez, The
Coloniality of Migration and the "Refugee Crisis": On the Asylum-Migration Nexus,
the Transatlantic White European Settler Colonialism-Migrationand Racial Capitalism, 34 REFUGE 16, 19 (2018); Priyanka Boghani, The "Human Cost" of the EU's Response to the Refugee Crisis, FRONTLINE (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh
Patrick
/frontline/article/the-human-cost-of-the-eus-response-to-the-refugee-crisis/;
Dehan, The EU Claims the Migrant Crisis is Over - That Doesn't Mean it's Over,
QUARTZ (Mar. 18, 2019), https://qz.com/1570617/refugees-in-africa-struggle-toreach-europe-as-the-eu-says-migrant-crisis-is-over/.
62. United Nations: More Than 20,000 Migrants Have Died Crossing Mediterranean Sea Since 2014, ASSOCIATED PRESS (March 6, 2020),
https://apnews.com/Of673e8410a70dd6b52e0a925848758a.
63. See Michael Birnbaum, Could the Flow of Migrants to Europe Be Stopped?,
WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/couldthe-flow-of-migrants-to-europe-be-stopped/2017/10/02/e76ac66e-a2ce- 1 1e7-b5738ec86cdfeledstory.html?noredirect=on&utmterm=.8b9b2aff2822.
64. See Helen Davidson, Offshore Detention: Australia'sRecent Immigration History A "Human Rights Catastrophe," THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/nov/13/offshore-detention-nauruimmigration-history-human-rights.
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In Europe, the U.S., and other affluent nations, the population is generally divided "between those whose movement is a
manifestation of liberty, and should therefore be maximized, and
those whose freedom is a problem, and should therefore be tightly
regulated."6" While corporations freely roam the world, racialized
bodies are policed, detained, incarcerated, and deported. Ironically, even though the mobility of the affluent (including air travel)
contributes disproportionately to climate change, 66 it is the mobil-

ity of the non-White poor that states restrict. 67 The North's exclusionary immigration policies do not bode well for climatedisplaced racialized communities.
B. CENTRAL AMERICA: IN THE VORTEX OF CLIMATE CHANGE
AND EMPIRE

Central American migration to the United States is driven
by poverty, conflict, and climate change. 68 Despite its minimal
contribution to climate change, Central America is one of the
world's most climate-vulnerable regions.6 9 According to the Fifth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), Central America is particularly vulnerable to
climate-related extreme weather events (such as droughts, hurricanes, floods, and storms) due to its geographic location and to65. HAGAR KOTEF, MOVEMENT AND THE ORDERING OF FREEDOM: ON LIBERAL
GOVERNANCE OF MOBILITY 100 (2015).
66. See Michael Le Page, It Turns Out Planes Are Even Worse for the Climate
Than We Thought," NEW SCIENTIST (June 27, 2019), https://www.new
scientist.com/article/2207886-it-turns-out-planes-are-even-worse-for-the-cimatethan-we-thought/?utm-medium=NLC&utmsource=NSNS&utm-campaign=2019-

0628-GLOBAL-NSDAY&utmcontent=NSDAY&fbclid=IwAROXZyNJfeCW7oNqC_
76vVN-B3xySh8hOOW4BEqdhZfgrKhcAjUwuBm-EX4; Josh Gabbatiss, Tourism Is
Responsible for Nearly One Tenth of the World's Carbon Emissions, THE
https://www.independent.co.uk/environment
(May 7, 2018),
INDEPENDENT
/tourism-cimate-change-carbon-emissions-global-warming-flying-cars-transport-

a8338946.html.
67. See MIMI SHELLER, MOBILITY JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF MOVEMENT IN AN
AGE OF EXTREMES 135 (2018).
68. See Jeff Masters, Fifth Straight Year of Central American Drought Helping to
Drive Migration, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Dec. 23, 2019), https://blogs.scientific
american.com/eye-of-the-storm/fifth-straight-year-of-central-american-droughthelping-drive-migration/; Todd Miller, Why the Migrant Caravan Story is a Climate
Change Story, YES MAGAZINE (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.yesmagazine.org/socialjustice/2018/11/28/why-the-migrant-caravan-story-is-a-climate-change-story/.
69. See ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
(ECLAC) ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE IN CENTRAL AMERICA: POTENTIAL IMPACTS AND
POLICY OPTIONS 15-16 (2018), https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/
39150/7/S1800827en.pdf [hereinafter, ECLAC].
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pography (including steep terrain and porous soils prone to mudslides) and its elevated levels of poverty and social exclusion.7 0
Indeed, approximately half the population of Central America
lives below the poverty line."
Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador-the countries experiencing the highest levels of migration to the United States-are
located in a stretch of Central America known as the "dry corridor" that suffers frequent and intense droughts.7" In 2014-2015,
for example, drought-related crop losses in the region left more
than half a million families on the brink of starvation, sparking
mass migration.7 3 Scientists predict that the region's aridity will
only increase in the coming decades.7 1 Climate change will exacerbate food insecurity among the poorest people in the region, especially in Guatemala where more than thirty percent of the population is already food insecure. It will depress the yields of
staple crops cultivated for domestic consumption (such as maize,
beans, and rice) and will also decrease coffee production, which
provides employment for at least 1.4 million people in Honduras,
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.76
The United States is deeply implicated in the economic precarity that renders Central America particularly susceptible to
climate change. Central Americans are fleeing to the United
States in record numbers to escape conflict and poverty that the
U.S. government helped create through countless military, economic, and political interventions.7 7 "US-backed military coups,
70. See GRACIELA 0. MAGRIN ET AL., Central America and South America, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY. PART B:
REGIONAL ASPECTS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
https://www.ipcc.chlsite/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-Chap27_
1508
(2014),
FINAL.pdf [hereinafter, IPCC, Central and South America]. "In November 2020,
Hurricanes Eta and Iota devastated Honduras and Guatemala displacing hundreds
of thousands of people and potentially triggering a new wave of migration," See Natalie Kitroeff, 2 Hurricanes Devastate Central America. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2020. http://nytimes.com/2020/12/04/world/americas/guatamala-hurricanes-mudslidemigration.htm.
71. See ECLAC, supra note 69, at 18.
72. See id. at 48.
73. See id. at 49-50.
74. See id. at 55-56, 58.
75. See IPCC, Central and South America, supra note 70, at 1530.
76. See GRACIELA 0. MAGRIN ET AL., supra note 70, at 1530.
77. See, e.g., Mark Tseng-Putterman, A Century of Intervention Created the Immigration Crisis. MEDIUM (June 20, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/timeline-us-
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corporate plundering, and neoliberal sapping of resources" destabilized the region and spawned the violence and economic deprivation that continue to drive people from their homes.78
While this article focuses on the most recent U.S. interventions in Central America, it is important to keep in mind the long
legacy of U.S. military and political incursions that have disrupted and impoverished the region. As Eduardo Galeano explains:
In the middle of the nineteenth century the filibusterer William Walker, operating on behalf of bankers Morgan and
Garrison, invaded Central America at the head of a band of
assassins. With the obliging support of the U.S. government,
Walker robbed, killed, burned, and in successive expeditions
proclaimed himself president of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and
Honduras. He restored slavery in the areas that suffered his
devastating occupation .... He was welcomed back to the
United States as a national hero. From then on, the invasions, bombardments, forced loans, and gun-point treaties followed one after the other. 9
These interventions were justified by racist ideologies, including
the doctrine of Manifest Destiny that portrayed "Latin Americans
as inferior in cultural makeup and bereft of democratic institutions." 80 Ironically, when democratically-elected leftist leaders did
come to power in Latin America, the U.S. government supported
their overthrow and backed their right-wing opponents in order
to maintain a business climate favorable to U.S. corporations. 8 1
In 1954, for example, the U.S. government overthrew the
democratically-elected president of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz,
whose land reform legislation threatened the interests of United
Fruit.82 "For the next four decades, [Guatemala's] people suffered
intervention-central-america-a9bea9ebcl48; Miles Culpepper, The Debt We Owe Central America, JACOBIN (Nov. 1, 2018), https://jacobinmag.com2018/11/centralamerica-migrant-caravan-trump.
78. See Tseng-Putterman, A Century of Intervention, supra note 77.
79. GALEANO, supra note 54, at 107.
80. GONZALEZ, supra note 26, at 43. Indeed, U.S. Preside James Buchanan, an
ardent beliver in Manifest Destiny, welcomed Walker to the White House. See id. at
50.
81. Id. at 77.
82. JUAN J. GONZALEZ, HARVEST OF EMPIRES: A HISTORY OF LATINOS IN AMERICA
136-37 (Revised ed. 2011) (Revised ed. 2011); ALAN MCPHERSON, A SHORT HISTORY
OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 139-146 (2016). For a
detailed analysis of the U.S.'s role in the overthrow of the Arbenz government, see

Loyola Law Review

416

[Vol. 66

government terror without equal in the modern history of Latin
America." 8 3 As opposition to the regime grew, the U.S. government financed the authoritarian regime's scorched earth military
campaign. 84 By the mid-1980s, the Guatemalan civil war had
killed 150,000 civilians and produced 250,000 refugees.85 Military
leaders would later be tried for genocide and crimes against humanity in connection with the mass killings of Mayan people during the country's thirty-six-year civil war (1960-1996).8"
In El Salvador, the U.S.-allied General Maximiliano Herndndez Martinez slaughtered approximately 30,000 Indigenous
peasants in 1932 when they rebelled against local landlords with
the assistance of the country's small Communist Party.8 7 Party
leader Agustin Farabundo Marti was executed amid violence so
widespread that it crushed popular opposition for decades. 88
When grassroots opposition re-emerged in the 1970s and threatened electoral victory, a series of military coups and electionrigging by the Salvadoran oligarchy triggered a full-scale civil
war. 89 U.S. military assistance to the country's right-wing authoritarian government during the 1980-1992 civil war was so massive that El Salvador became the largest recipient of U.S. military
aid in all of Latin America 90 The civil war killed over 75,000 people, 91 and caused at least 334,000 Salvadorans to flee to the United States. 92
In Honduras, U.S. entrepreneurs and government officials
helped launch a 1911 coup against President Miguel Ddvila, pavSTEPHEN SCHLESINGER ET AL., BITTER FRUIT: THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN COUP
(2nd ed. 2005); see also, Roberto Garcia Ferreira, The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz: History
of a Disinformation Campaign, 25 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 59 (2008).
83. GONZALEZ, supra note 26, at 137.
84. See MCPHERSON, supra note 82, at 146.
85. See Tseng-Putterman, A Century of Intervention, supra note 77.
86. See Sofia Menchu, Guatemala to Try More Former Top Military Officials for
Maya Genocide, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/usguatemala-justice/guatemala-to-try-more-former-top-military-officials-for-maya-

genocide-idUSKBN1Y402K.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
2010),
92.

See GONZALEZ, supra note 26, at 133.
See id at 133.
See id. at 134.
See id at 134-35.

El Salvador's Funes Apologizes for Civil War Abuses, REUTERS (Jan. 16,

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-elsalvador-idUSTRE60F26M20100116.
See Sara Gammage, El Salvador: Despite End of Civil War, Emigration Continues, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (July 26, 2007), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
article/el-salvador-despite-end-civil-war-emigration-continues.
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ing the way for decades-long domination of the national economy
by United Fruit and other U.S. companies 93 and strong U.S. ties
to the Honduran military. 94 In the 1980s, the U.S. stationed
thousands of troops in Honduras to train right-wing Contra rebels in their guerrilla insurgency against Nicaragua's Sandinista
government. 95 In 2009, when left-leaning, democratically-elected
president Manuel Zelaya was overthrown in a military coup, the
U.S. refused to join the calls for Zelaya's immediate and unconditional reinstatement. 96 The U.S.-backed regime "proceeded to
persecute progressive social movements and severely damage the
country's democratic institutions," producing a wave of migrants
fleeing the violence instituted by the government. 97
The end of the Central American civil wars in the 1990s inaugurated new forms of intervention and dispossession. "Having
barely survived Reagan's escalation of the Cold War in the 1980s,
countries in Central America were pushed by Washington in the
1990s to open up their economies to mining, large-scale biofuel
production, and transnational agricultural corporations." 98 In
Honduras and Guatemala, transnational agricultural corporations and local elites have converted large parcels of land into oil
palm plantations, expelling peasant, Indigenous, and Afrodescendant communities. 9 9 Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador have been wracked by conflicts with local communities over
mining, oil and gas development, and large-scale dams.1 00 As a
consequence of the Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA), highly subsidized U.S. agricultural products have entered Central American markets at prices well below the local
cost of production, devastating the livelihoods of small subsist-

93. See Tseng-Putterman, A Century of Intervention, supra note 77.

94. See Joseph Nevins, How US Policy in Honduras Set the

Stage for Today's Mi-

gration, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 25, 2018), https://theconversation.com/how-uspolicy-in-honduras-set-the-stage-for-todays-migration-65935.
95. See id.; see Tseng-Putterman, A Century of Intervention, supra note 77.
96. See id.; Dangerous Complacencies:Obama, Latin America, and the Misconception of Power, 38 LATIN AM. PERSPECTIVES 14, 14-15 (2011).
97. Culpepper, supra note 77; see generally DANA FRANK, THE LONG HONDURAS
NIGHT: RESISTANCE, TERROR, AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE

COUP (2018).
98. GREG GRANDIN, THE END OF THE MYTH: FROM THE FRONTIER TO THE BORDER
WALL IN THE MIND OF AMERICA 244-245 (2019).

99. See William Robinson, The Second Implosion of Central America, NACLA
(Jan. 28, 2019), https://nacla.org/news/2019/01/28/second-implosion-central-america.
100. See id.
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ence farmers and driving rural-to-urban migration.1 0 1 The entire
region experiences low levels of employment in the formal sector,
high levels of government corruption, and escalating drug trafficking, violence, and government repression of popular resistance.1 0 2

Much of the violence that currently plagues El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala has its origins in U.S. mass incarceration, drug enforcement, and counterinsurgency policies.1 03 The
U.S. government's mass incarceration of young Central American
immigrants in the 1980s during the so-called "war on drugs" created the training ground for the militarized, hierarchical gangs
that currently threaten the region. 104 When these gang members
were deported in large numbers in the 1990s, they began to terrorize the local population, initially in El Salvador and later in
Honduras and Guatemala. 105 The atrocities committed by U.S.trained soldiers and U.S.-aligned paramilitaries during the Salvadoran and Guatemalan civil wars, including executions of targeted populations and the use of rape as a tool of social control,
have left a lingering legacy. 106 Today, death squads that include
military, police, and civilians inflict extralegal violence, including
execution of suspected gang members. 107 Human rights activists,
trade unionists, and journalists face high levels of harassment,
repression, and death.108 "This lawlessness is both a cause and ef101. See Ben Lilliston, Climate Change, CAFTA and Forced Migration, INSTITUTE
FOR AGRIcULTURAL TRADE PoL'Y (May 16, 2019), https://www.iatp.org/blog/201908/
climate-change-cafta-and-forced-migration.
102. See id.

103. See Sara Knopp, There is No Private Violence, JACOBIN (Nov. 27, 2018),
https://jacobinmag.com/2018/11/central-america-migrants-asylum-ms13-gangviolence; Eric Levitz, We Owe Central American Migrants Much More Than This,
N.Y. INTELLIGENCER, June 21, 2018, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/06/weowe-central-american-migrants-much-more-than-this.html.
104. See Knopp, supra note 103.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See Sara Knopp, There is No Private Violence, JACOBIN (Nov. 27, 2018); Brett
Wilkins, The Salvadoran Option: the US is Once Again Supporting Death Squads in
Central America, COUNTERPUNcH (June 5, 2018), https://www.counterpunch.org
/2018/06/05/the-salvador-option-the-us-is-once-again-supporting-death-squads-incentral-america/.
108. See Christine Wade, Activists' Murder Show Human Rights under Assault in
Latin America, WORLD POL. REV. (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.worldpolitics
review.com/articles/18262/activists-murders-show-human-rights-under-assault-inlatin-america (discussing the murder of human rights and environmental activists in
Latin America, including indigenous environmental activist Berta Cdceres in Hondu-
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"

fect of widespread public distrust in state police forces, which are
largely non-professionalized, frequently penetrated by criminal
gangs, and historically associated with atrocities carried out in
times of political unrest and civil war."1 09 Finally, the criminalization of drug use, production, and distribution in the United
States, combined with high U.S. drug consumption, inflates the
profitability of the drug trade and creates incentives for the proliferation of extremely violent drug cartels." 0 Many Central
American women and children have fled to the United States because Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador have the highest
rates of gender-based violence in the world (except for war zones)
and because the gangs routinely target young people for forcible
recruitment.
At the vortex of climate change and empire, Central Americans continue to flee poverty, drought, and violence. 2 Instead of
recognizing the debt that it owes to Central America for its military, economic, and political interventions in the region and for
its failure to tackle climate change, the United States continues
to detain, deport, and demonize Central American migrants, including children."1 Held in ice-cold, filthy detention centers, Central American migrants face grim conditions, including overcrowding, inadequate food, poor or nonexistent medical care, cruel and inhumane guards, and lack of blankets, toothbrushes,
toothpaste, toilet paper and potable drinking water.1 1 4 In addition
ras and Walter Mendez Barrios in Guatemala); Tula Connell, Trade Unionists Face
Death, Attacks in Central America, AFL-CIO SOLIDARITY CTR. (Aug. 7, 2019),

https://www.solidaritycenter.org/report-unionists-face-death-attacks-in-centralamerica/.
109. Levitz, supra note 103.
110. See id.
111. Knopp, supra note 103; see Stephen Kinzer, How "Femicide"Drove the Caravan, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion
/2018/12/05/how-femicide-drove-caravan/EKIQC9gBIPQM55yv45UFiK/story.html.
112. See Allison O'Connor et al., Central American Immigrants in the United
States, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
article/central-american-immigrants-united-states.
113. Zolan Kanno-Youngs, In Shift, US Vows to More Aggressively Deport Migrant
Families, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/us/politics/
ice-migrant-families.html; Amelia Cheatham, U.S. Detention of Child Migrants,
COUNCIL OF FOREIGN REL. BACKGROUNDER (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/us-detention-child-migrants.

114. See Andrew Gumbel, "They were laughing at us": Immigrants Tell of Cruelty,
Illness and Filth in US Detention, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.comlus-news/2018/sep/12/us-immigration-detentionfacilities.
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to the trauma of being separated from their parents," 5 thousands
of detained children have also reported sexual abuse by adult
staff members and by other detainees. 116 Migrants who are deported face even worse outcomes. According to Human Rights
Watch, hundreds of deportees have been killed, raped, or tortured
when they were returned to their country of origin." 7
President Trump has deployed racist, dehumanizing language to rationalize his administration's cruel and punitive immigration policies, referring to Central American migrants as
"animals," just as he had earlier depicted Mexican migrants as
"drug dealers, criminals, rapists."1 18 While the Trump administration's treatment of Central American migrants has garnered
well-deserved national and international condemnation,

19

it is

important to recognize that U.S. immigration law has consistently been driven by racial animus against communities of color.12 0
From the Chinese exclusion acts of the late nineteenth century to
the racially discriminatory national origin quotas that favored
Northern European migrants (which were not repealed until
1965), racialized communities have long been singled out for
harsh treatment under U.S. immigration law. 12 1
115. See generally Martin

H.

Teicher, Childhood Trauma and the Enduring Conse-

quences of Forcibly SeparatingChildren from Parents at the United States Border, 16
BMC MEDICINE 146 (2018).
116. Matthew Haag, Thousands of Immigrant Children Said They Were Sexually
Abused in U.S. Detention Center, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/us/immigrant-children-sexual-abuse.html.
117. Nina Lakhani, Hundreds of Salvadorans Deported by US Were Killed or
Abused, report reveals, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.theguardian.coml
Sybilla
see
world/2020/feb/05/salvadorans-deported-us-killed-abused-report;
Brodzinsky & Ed Pilkington, US Government Deporting Central American Migrants
to Their Deaths, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/oct/12/obama-immigration-deportations-central-america.
118. See Nicole Austin-Hillery, Trump's Racist Language Serves Abusive Immigration Policies, HUM. RTS. WATCH DISPATCHES (May 22, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/
news/2018/05/22/trumps-racist-language-serves-abusive-immigration-policies#.
119. See, e.g., Joel Rose & Laura Smitherman, Fear, Confusion and Separationas
Trump Administration Sends MigrantsBack to Mexico, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (NPR) (July
1, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/01/736908483/fear-confusion-and-separationas-trump-administration-sends-migrants-back-to-mex.
120. See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "MagicMirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 78 IND. L. J. 1111 (1998); Kelly
Lytle Hernandez, America's Mass Deportation System is Rooted in Racism, THE
CONVERSATION (Feb 26, 2017), https://theconversation.com/americas-massdeportation-system-is-rooted-in-racism-73426.
121. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, The New Nativism: Something Old, Something New,
Something Borrowed, Something Blue, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND
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An analysis of climate change grounded in racial capitalism
reveals a key thread that unites the abuses described in Parts A
and B of this section-the classification of a significant segment
of humanity as inferior, expendable, exploitable, and disposable.
Racialization justifies and naturalizes violence and dispossession-in war zones, in resource extraction zones, and in the refugee camps and migrant detention centers of the Global North. As
geographer Ruth Wilson Gilmore explains, racism is not simply
prejudice or discrimination, but "state-sanctioned or extralegal
production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability
to premature death."1 22

IV. MIGRATION AS REPARATION
Drawing upon the lessons of racial capitalism and the Central American case study, this section examines the emerging international legal and policy responses to climate displacement.
Specifically, this section discusses the ways that racialized discourses permeate many of these approaches and obscure who actually benefits from harsh and abusive migration policies. The
section concludes by proposing a different approach: migration as
reparation.
A. CLIMATE DISPLACEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Climate-displaced persons who cross national borders are not
accorded legal recognition and protection as refugees under international law. 1 2 3 The only treaty applicable to cross-border displacement is the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees (hereinafter, the 1951 Refugee Convention), which
prohibits states from deporting refugees to a place where their
life or freedom would be threatened.1 2 4 However, the treaty de-

THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 165, 167-176 (Juan Perea ed.
1997).
122. RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 28 (2007).
123. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Climate Justice and Climate Displacement: Evaluating the Emerging Legal and Policy Responses, 36 WIS. INT'L L. J. 366, 380 (2019);
Sumudu Atapattu, Climate Change: DisappearingStates, Migration, and Challenges
for InternationalLaw, 4 WASH J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 25-26 (2014).
124. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, art. 33 11, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention]. Although the treaty
was initially limited to refugees displaced during World War II, the Convention's
1967 Protocol extended its protections to all political refugees. See Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
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fines refugees as persons outside their country of origin who are
unable or unwilling to return due to a "well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group, or political opinion."1 " Climatedisplaced persons do not generally fit this definition. 126 Furthermore, even migrants who arguably meet this restrictive legal
standard are frequently confined in detention facilities, and required to prove their well-founded fear of persecution without the
benefit of legal representation. 127 In the United States, for example, migrant children as young as three years old have been compelled to represent themselves in deportation proceedings without
legal counsel and without their parents who could explain the
conditions in their home country that caused them to flee.128
Some scholars have proposed amending or liberally reinterpreting the 1951 Refugee Convention to protect climatedisplaced persons. 129 However, this idea has encountered resistance on the ground that it "might undermine what little legal
protection is available to political refugees."13 0 States have generally rejected proposals to treat climate-displaced persons as refugees due to the increasingly contentious nature of migration poli-

125. 1951 Refugee Convention, art. 1.
126. See Thea Philip, Climate Change Displacement and Migration:An Analysis of

the Current International Regime's Deficiency, Proposed Solutions and a Way Forward, 19 MELBOURNE J. INT'L. L. 639, 644-648 (2018) (discussing the unsuccessful

refugee applications in Australia and New Zealand by persons seeking protection
from the impacts of climate change). Acknowledging that climate displaced persons
face "xenophobia, difficulty in their access to food, water, health care and housing,
and the ever-present threats of arbitrary detention, human trafficking, violent attack, rape and torture, among others," the United Nations Human Rights Council
has urged states to take action to protect their rights even though climate displaced
persons do not generally qualify as refugees. See Rep. of the U.N. High Comm'r for
Hum. Rts., Summary of the Panel Discussion on Human Rights., Climate Change,
Migrants and Persons Displaced across International Borders, 15 7-8 U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/37/37 (Nov. 14, 2017).
127. ASHLEY DAWSON, EXTREME CITIES: THE PERIL AND PROMISE OF URBAN LIFE

/

IN THE AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 197, 202 (2017).
128. Christina Jewett & Shefali Luthra, Immigrant Toddlers Ordered to Appear in
27
Court Alone, TX. TRIB. (June 27, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/06/
immigrant-toddlers-ordered-appear-court-alone/.
129. See Beatriz Felipe Perez, Beyond the Shortcomings of International Law: A
Proposal for the Legal Protection of Climate Migrants, in "CLIMATE REFUGEES":
BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE? 218-219 (Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018).

130. Uwe Ltibken, Introduction: Chasing a Ghost? Environmental Change and Migrationin History, 5 GLOBAL ENvT. 4, 8 (2012).

2020] Climate Change and the Disruption of Borders

423

cys'i and due to the unwillingness of states to assume the socioeconomic burden of accepting large numbers of displaced persons. 132 Furthermore, even if states did grant refugee-like protection to climate-displaced persons, these "climate refugees" would
undoubtedly encounter the same obstacles enumerated aboveincreasingly militarized borders, confinement in detention centers, denial of legal representation, and the insurmountable burden of proving that their multi-faceted and complex decision to
migrate can be attributed exclusively to climate change.
Several states have offered temporary protection from deportation on humanitarian grounds to disaster-displaced persons
who do not face individual persecution.1 3 3 However, temporary
protection is discretionary, may not be an adequate remedy for
climate-displaced persons whose countries become permanently
uninhabitable, and may not be available in an era of intensifying
xenophobia.13 4

International human rights law imposes additional obligations on states, including the prohibition on deporting persons "at
risk of arbitrary deprivation of life, torture, or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment" even though these persons
may not be eligible for refugee status.135 Known as nonrefoulement or complementary protection, 3 ' this obligation may
provide at least limited relief to climate-displaced persons. In a
ground-breaking decision issued in January 2020, the United Na131. See ELIN JAKOBSsoN, Norm Formalization in InternationalPolicy Formula-

tion: A Framework for Analysis, in "CLIMATE REFUGEES": BEYOND THE LEGAL
IMPASSE? 63-64 (Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018).
132. See Tarja Ketola, Climigration:How to Plan Climate Migration by Learning

from History? 8 GLOBAL ENVT. 410, 412 (2015).
133. See MADELINE GARLICK ET AL., Enhancing Legal Protection for People Displaced in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities, in "CLIMATE REFUGEES'": BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE? 118, 121-122 (Simon
Behrman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018); Theki Anastasiou, Public InternationalLaw's
Applicability to Migration as Adaptation: Fit for Purpose? in "CLIMATE REFUGEES':
BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE? 172, 182-183 (Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent eds.,
2018).
134. See Anastasiou, Migration as Adaptation at 183; GARLICK ET AL. CLIMATE
REFUGEES at 122; see Europe's Hostile Environment Deters Asylum Seekers, THE
2018),
http://www.theweek.co.uk/94383/is-europe-s-hostile19,
WEEK
(June
environment-turning-off-asylum-seekers.
135. JOLANDA VAN DER VLIET, "Climate Refugees": A Legal Mapping Exercise, in
"CLIMATE REFUGEES": BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE? 16, 22 (Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018).
136. See id.

424

Loyola Law Review

[Vol. 66

tions Human Rights Committee determined that the adverse impacts of climate change may violate Article 6 (right to life) and
Article 7 (prohibition on torture or cruel and degrading treatment) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) - thereby triggering the prohibition on deportation.13 7
Nevertheless, the Committee decided that New Zealand's deportation of the petitioner was lawful because his home country of
Kiribati is not predicted to become uninhabitable for ten to fifteen
years, allowing sufficient time for the government of Kiribati,
with international support, to protect its population. 138 While this
case constitutes a landmark ruling on the obligations of states to
climate-displaced persons, the decision raises questions about
how dire conditions must be in climate-vulnerable countries before non-refoulement or complementary protection are legally required.
Finally, international environmental law has begun to focus
on the plight of climate-displaced persons. The Paris Agreement,
adopted in 2015 pursuant to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), explicitly recognizes
the need to address climate-induced harms that cannot be avoided through mitigation and adaptation (such as displacement) - a
concept known as loss and damage. 139 The decision adopting the
Paris Agreement specifically requires the development of "recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize, and
address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate
change."1 " Because the formal incorporation of loss and damage
into the climate regime is relatively new, it is difficult to predict
how this regime will contend with climate displacement."

137. United Nations Human Rights Committee,

CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016,

at

1 9.11 (Jan. 7, 2020).
138. Id. at 1 9.12.
139. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Climate Justice and Climate Displacement:Evaluating the Emerging Legal and Policy Responses, 36 WIS. INT'L L. J. 366, 378 (2019);
See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of Parties, TwentyFirst Session, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, ¶1 48-50, art. 8(1)-(3), U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Paris Agreement] (includes the
Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage in article 8 of the Paris
Agreement and instructing the mechanism's Executive Committee to address climate
displacement).
140. Paris Agreement, supra note 139, at ¶ 50.
141. See Gonzalez, supra note 59, at 378-379.
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In the absence of an established legal framework for climatedisplaced persons, several legal and policy approaches are emerging. Each approach is discussed and critiqued below.
1. THE NATIONAL SECURITY RESPONSE
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has portrayed
climate change as a "threat-multiplier" that endangers national
security.1 42 Indeed, as early as 2003, a Pentagon-commissioned
report predicted that climate change could destabilize less prosperous regions of the world by disrupting access to food, water,
and energy-thereby escalating conflict and triggering the "mass
emigration" of "desperate people" to the United States. 143 In 2014,
DHS concluded:

"

[C]limate change and associated trends . . aggravate stressors abroad that can enable terrorist activity and violence,
such as poverty, environmental degradation, and social tensions. More severe droughts and tropical storms, especially in
Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, could also increase population movements, both legal and illegal, across
the U.S. border.
The national security response reinforces "deep-seated fears
and stereotypes of the dark-skinned, overbreeding, dangerous
poor" penetrating U.S. borders or arriving on European shores.1 45
Instead of promoting compassion for climate-displaced persons or
recognition of the responsibility of high-emitting powerful states
for causing climate change and exacerbating climate vulnerability, the national security approach reinforces racialized distinctions between "us and them, citizen and foreigner, friend and en-

142. Caitlin Werrell & Francesco Femia, DHS to Congress Climate Change a Thiat Multiplier to Global Security, CUMATE AND SEC. (July 9, 2015), https://climateandsecurity.org/2015/
07/09/dhs-to-congress-climate-change-a-threat-multiplier-to-global-security/.
143. Peter Schwarz & Doug Randall, An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its
Implications for United States National Security 2-5 (2003), https://www.iatp.org/
sites/default/files/An_AbruptClimateChange-Scenario-andIts Impl.pdf;
Miller,
supra note 1.
144. 2014
QUADRENNIAL
HOMELAND
SEcURITY
REVIEW
22
(2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/qhsr/2014-QHSR.pdf.
145. Betsy Hartmann, Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric,
Reality and he Politicsof Policy Discourse, 22 J. INT'L DEV. 233, 238 (2010).
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emy," 146 and produces fear, hatred, and the militarization of borders.1 4 1
The threat of mass relocation from South to North is also at
odds with historic patterns of migration and displacement. For
example, in 2017, 68.5 million people were forcibly displaced
worldwide, but the vast majority-approximately 40 millionremained within their country of origin.1 48 Most displaced persons
who did cross national borders settled in neighboring countries in
the Global South, which host eighty-five percent of the world's
refugees. 149 "Only a relatively small, albeit increasing proportion
of refugees worldwide have managed to come to the Global North,
mostly to Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, and the United
States."1 50 Thus, the burden of caring for the world's displaced
persons has fallen disproportionately on the Global South.
2. THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE
A second response to climate displacement depoliticizes climate change by framing it through a humanitarian and charitable lens. The humanitarian response to climate displacement depicts climate-displaced persons as passive and helpless victims
who need to be rescued by the benevolence of affluent countries. 15 1 Instead of requiring the North to compensate displaced
persons for the harms caused by the North's profligate greenhouse gas emissions and its colonial and post-colonial plunder of
Southern resources, the humanitarian approach portrays Northern assistance to climate-vulnerable states and peoples as a form

of charity.

152

146. Hedda Ransan-Cooper et al., Being(s) Framed: The Means and Ends of Framing Environmental Migration, 35 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE, 106, 110 (2015).
147. Mark Karlin, Climate Change Refugees Face Militarized Borders, TRUTHOUT
(Oct. 1, 2017), https://truthout.org/articles/climate-change-refugees-face-militarizedborders/.
148. See United Nations High Comm'r for Refugees, Rep. on Global Trends: Forced
Displacement in 2017, 2 (June 25, 2018), http://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf [here-

inafter Global Trends].
149. See id. at 2.
150. Andre Bank & Christiane Fr6hlich, Forced Migration in the Global South: Reorienting the Debate, GER. INST. OF GLOB. & AREA STUD., at 3 (June 2018),
https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/gf-global_03-en.pdf.
151. See Hedda Ransan-Cooper et al., Being(s) Framed: The Means and Ends of
FramingEnvironmentalMitgration, 35, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE, 106, 109 (2015).
152. Id.
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The Nansen Initiative is an example of a legal framework for
disaster displacement based on the humanitarian approach.
Spearheaded by Norway and Switzerland in 2012, the Nansen Initiative is a state-led intergovernmental process that sets out a
series of principles to provide protection and assistance to displaced persons who cross national borders due to disasters. 15 3
These principles are currently being implemented by the Nansen
Initiative's successor, the Platform on Disaster Displacement,1 54
which seeks to integrate best practices on cross-border disaster
displacement into existing legal frameworks in lieu of negotiating
a new treaty. 155
The Nansen Initiative represents a significant improvement
over the national security approach, but it is flawed in several
important respects. First, the Nansen Initiative's emphasis on
charity rather than historic responsibility obscures the North's
responsibility for climate change and for colonial and postcolonial policies that impoverished the Global South and increased its climate vulnerability. Second, the Nansen initiative's
emphasis on voluntary implementation is likely to flounder in an
era of escalating racialized hostility toward migrants and refugees. Third, the Nansen Initiative's state-led approach may obscure the priorities and perspectives of climate migrants, thereby
inflicting procedural injustice. 156 Finally, the Nansen Initiative is
limited to disaster-related displacement, and may not offer pro-

153. See generally THE NANSEN INITIATIVE, AGENDA FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CROss-BORDER DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS AND
CLIMATE CHANGE (2015), https://nanseninitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/
PROTECTION-AGENDA-VOLUME-lpdf; Francois Gemenne and Pauline Brucker,

From GuidingPrinciples on Internal Displacement to the Nansen Initiative: What the
Governance of Environmental Migration Can Learn from the Governance of Internal
Displacement, 27 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 245, 258 (2015).
154. See PLATFORM ON DISASTER DISPLACEMENT, State-led, Regional, Consultative

Processes: Opportunities to Develop Legal Frameworks on Disaster Displacement, in
"CLIMATE REFUGEES": BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE? 126, 127-128 (Simon Behrman
& Avidan Kent eds., 2018).
155. See id. at 136; Jane McAdam, From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on

DisasterDisplacement: Shaping InternationalApproaches to Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement, 39 UNIV. N.S.W. L. J. 1518, 1520 (2016).
156. See MAXINE BURKETT, Justice and Climate Migration, in "CLIMATE
REFUGEES": BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE? 73, 82 (Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent
eds. 2018).
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tection to persons who migrate due to slow-onset events such as
desertification, sea level rise, and chronic flooding."'
Another humanitarian approach, the Sendai Framework for
Disaster Risk Reduction, fosters international cooperation to mitigate disaster risks, including climate displacement, before they
occur. 158 While this framework introduces important innovations,

including its bottom-up approach to disaster risk reduction and
its emphasis on socio-economic vulnerability, the Sendai Framework, like its predecessor the Hyogo Framework, is also grounded
in Northern charity rather than historic responsibility 159 and
therefore replicates many of the flaws of the Nansen Initiative.
3. THE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

The third response to climate displacement consists of stategoverned human mobility to avoid disruptive, unauthorized mass
migration. 160 The migration management approach promotes migrant worker programs in the Global North as a means of enhancing climate resilience in the Global South.16 1 Instead of depicting climate-displaced persons as threats to national security
or helpless victims dependent on state protection, the migration
management response recognizes the agency, ingenuity and innovation of migrant workers."6 2 Temporary labor migration is
framed as a form of entrepreneurship that generates remittances
with which to finance climate change adaptation in the migrant's

157. See SUMUDU ANOPAMA ATAPATTU, A New Category of Refugees?: "Climate Refugees"and a Gaping Hole in InternationalLaw, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE
LEGAL IMPASSE? 34, 43, 45 (Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018)
158. See G.A. Res. 69/283, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction at 17-18
(June 3, 2015), https://www.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfor
drren.pdf. The Sendai Framework was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in
2015. G.A. Res. 69/283, at 2 (June 3, 2015).
159. See generally PAUL J. GOVIND & ROBERT R.M. VERcHICK, Natural Disaster
and Climate Change, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL
SOUTH 491, 494 (Shawkat Alam et al. eds, 2015) (discussing the predecessor to the
Sendai Framework).
160. See Dayna Scott & Adrian A. Smith, The Abstract Subject of the Climate Migrant: Displaced by the Rising Tides of the Green Energy Economy, 8 J. HUM. RTS.
AND ENV'T 30, 43 (2017).

161. See Romain Felli, ManagingClimate Insecurity by Ensuring Continuous Capital Accumulation: "Climate Refugees" and "Climate Migrants," 18 NEW POL. ECON.
337, 339 (2013).

162. Id. at 350; Chris Methmann & Angela Oels, From "Fearing"to "Empowering"
Climate Refugees: Governing Climate-InducedMigration in the Name of Resilience 46
SEC. DIALOGUE 51, 59 (2015).
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country of origin.16 3 Rather than treating climate displacement as
a tragedy to be prevented at all costs, the migration management
response transforms adversity into an opportunity to foster "climate-smart development" in communities left behind, provided
that the migration process takes place under the watchful eye
and careful management of states and institutions of global governance. 164
The migration management response relies on remittances
by migrants-instead of financial contributions by affluent, highemitting states-to finance climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction in climate-vulnerable Southern states. 165 Romain Felli summarizes the flaws in this approach:
Rather than understanding 'climate refugees' as victims of
climate change produced by industrialized countries, and
thus as in need of justice (which could take the form of funding for adaptation), these individuals are turned, through a
'positive story,' into entrepreneurial migrants who not only
can lift themselves out of poverty but may also contribute to
the 'resilience' of their 'vulnerable' communities. 166
By portraying climate-displaced persons as entrepreneurs rather
than victims of injustice, the migration management response absolves the North of its responsibility for climate change and for
the military, economic, and political interventions that exacerbated the climate vulnerability of the Global South. 167
The migration management response is problematic for several additional reasons. First, it is premised on the authority of
states to contain, control, and limit migration, and does not impose an affirmative obligation to accept climate-displaced persons. 168 Indeed, the migration management response invites
Northern states to cherry pick "desirable" migrants and exclude

163. See Felli, supra note 161, at 339; Giovanni Bettini et al., One Step Forward,
Two Steps Back? The Fading Contours of (In)justice in Competing Discourses on Climate Migration, 183 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 348, 352-353 (2017).
164. See Methmann & Oels, supra note 162, at 59, 62.
165. See id. at 63; Bettini et al., supra note 163, at 354.
166. See Felli, supra note 161, at 350.
167. See Giovanni Bettini et al., One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Fading
Contours of (In)justice in Competing Discourses on Climate Migration, 183
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 348, 353-354 (2017).
168. See Methmann & Oels, supra note 162, at 61.
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those deemed "undesirable." 69 Given the racialized nature of migration, desirable migrants are likely to be young, able-bodied,
skilled, educated, and light-skinned; undesirable migrants consigned to "illegality," informality, and expendability, will likely
consist of those who are darker-skinned, older, poorer, unskilled,
or disabled. 170 Second, the migration management response does
not require Northern States to grant these "entrepreneurial" migrants labor rights, social safety nets, and the ability to protest
dangerous or abusive working conditions without facing deportation.17 1 While there is a human rights treaty that protects migrant workers-the International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families-not a single affluent, labor-importing Northern country has
thus far ratified this treaty. 17 2 Finally, the migration of ablebodied workers can intensify the vulnerability of "trapped populations" who do not have the skills or the resources to compete in
international labor markets. 173 Women are likely to be overrepresented among these "trapped populations" because they
generally have less education, fewer employment opportunities,
greater family care obligations, and higher vulnerability to trafficking and interpersonal violence.1 7 4

169. See Bettini et al., supra note 163, at 353.
170. See, e.g., SUKETU MEHTA,

THIS LAND

Is OUR LAND:

AN IMMIGRANT'S

MANIFESTO at 129-135 (describing the preference for White immigrants and the exclusion of non-White immigrants).
171. See Felli, supra note 161, at 354.
172. See G.A. Res. 45/158, Convention for the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families
(Dec.
18,
1992),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Professionallnterest/cmw.pdf; (entered into force
July 1, 2003) [hereinafter UN Convention on Migrant Workers]; United Nations,
U.N. High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., Status of Ratification, https://treaties.un.org/pages
NiewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-13&chapter=4 (last visited, March
19, 2020). https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume I/Chapter IV/IV13.en.pdf.
173. See Chris Methmann & Angela Oels, From "Fearing"to "Empowering"Climate
Refugees: Governing Climate-Induced Migration in the Name of Resilience 46 SEC.
DIALOGUE 51, 61 (2015); Susannah Willcox, Climate Change Inundation, SelfDetermination, and Atoll Island States, 38 HUM. RTS. QUARTERLY 1022, 1023-1024
(2016).
174. See Cecilia Sorensen, et al, Climate change and women's health: Impacts and
policy directions. 15 PLoS MED. 1, 4, 6-7 (2018), https://journals.plos.org
/plosmedicine/article/file?id=10. 1371/journal.pmed. 1002603&type-printable.
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4. THE SELF-DETERMINATION RESPONSE
In order to develop alternatives to the legal and policy
frameworks favored by the Global North, this section considers
the perspectives and priorities of those who face actual or imminent displacement. As critical race scholar Mari Matsuda observes, "looking to the bottom"-to those who experience the
greatest disadvantage from the contemporary legal order-can
help us understand law's operation and define just solutions. 17 1
"Those who are oppressed in the present world can speak most eloquently of a better one. Their language will not be abstracted,
detached, or inaccessible; their program will not be undefined." 17 6
Looking to the bottom will provide insights that may be overlooked by legal scholars and policymakers. 177
One response to climate displacement that has been articulated by Southern states and peoples is the right of displaced persons to migrate collectively as a form of self-determination. 178 The
right of peoples to self-determination is recognized in several legal instruments, including common Article 1 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 179 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR); 180 the United Nations General Assembly Declaration
of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-

175. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 400 (1987).
176. Id. at 346-347.
177. See id. at 325-326.
178. See generally Willcox, supra note 173; Sophie Pascoe. Sailing the Waves on
Our Own: Climate Migration, Self-Determination, and the Carteret Islands. 15
QUEENSLAND UNIV. TECH. L. REV. 72 (2015); Amy Maguire and Jeffrey McGee, A
Universal Human Right to Shape Responses to a Global Problem? The Role of SelfDetermination in Guiding the InternationalLegal Response to Climate Change." 26
REV. EuRo. COMMUNITY AND INT'L ENVTL. L. 54 (2017).
179. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, 16 December
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976).
180. See International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, 16
December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
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ples; 181 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 182
Self-determination is the right of subordinated peoples to determine their own destiny rather than having it imposed on them
by foreign powers. 183 It is a collective right held by members of a
nation-state as well as a right of certain territorially-defined people within a nation-state, such as Indigenous peoples.1 84 Climate
vulnerable states and peoples, spearheaded by the small island
developing states (SIDS) in the Pacific, are demanding the right
to collectively determine their own fates in order to preserve
community cohesion, cultural integrity, political agency, and selfgovernance. 185 Emphasizing that active travel among the islands
was the norm in Oceania prior to the imposition of colonial borders, they are calling for new forms of transnational solidarity
and new concepts of citizenship that transcend "the model of citizenship of the Peace of Westphalia." 186 Procedurally, the selfdetermination response calls for consultative, participatory,
place-based, and culture-specific approaches that allow people to
collectively decide whether, when, where, and how they will migrate.187 Substantively, the self-determination approach requires

&

181. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514(XV), at ¶ 2 (Dec. 14, 1960) ("All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development").
182. G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295, at art. 3 (Sept. 13, 2007) ("Indigenous peoples have
the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development").
183. Robert A. Williams, Columbus's Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial Discriminationagainst Indigenous Peoples'Rightsof Self-Determination, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L
AND COMP. L. 51, 51 (1991).
184. See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES (1988); S. JAMES
ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 97-115 (2nd ed. 2004) (describing self-determination as a foundational principle of international treaty and customary law applicable to indigenous peoples).
185. See generally Ransan-Cooper et al, supra note 146; see generally Silja Klepp
Johannes Herbeck, The Politics of Environmental Migration and Climate Justice in
the Pacific Region, 7 J. HUM. RTS. AND ENVT. 54 (2016). See Maxine Burkett, The Nation Ex-Situ: On Climate Change, DeterritorializedNationhood and the Post-Climate
Era, 2 CLIMATE L. 345 (2011); Rosemary Rayfuse, InternationalLaw and Disappearing States: Maritime Zones and the Criteriafor Statehood, 41 ENVTL. POL'Y AND L.
281 (2011).
186. See Silja Klepp & Johannes Herbeck, The Politics of EnvironmentalMigration
and Climate Justice in the Pacific Region, 7 J. HUM. RTS. AND ENVT. 54, 71 (2016).
187. See Ransan-Cooper et al., supra note 146, at 112.
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affluent states to cede territory and make resources available to
facilitate the collective migration of climate-displaced persons as
a form of compensation for climate change.18 8 Concerned that a
multilateral treaty on climate displacement may not respond to
community values and concerns, several climate-vulnerable
states and Indigenous peoples are pursuing bilateral and regional
accords that address unique local needs, reflect common histories
and traditions, and respect the right of displaced persons to reconstitute themselves as self-governing communities on the territory of another state. 189

The self-determination response will encounter various
forms of resistance. High-emitting former colonial powers will
undoubtedly oppose any demand that requires them to cede territory or provide resources to accommodate climate-displaced persons. The self-determination response will also require mechanisms to resolve conflicts among heterogeneous climate-displaced
communities regarding adaptation and migration pathways (such
as diverging views based on gender, class, religion, ethnicity and
other divisions). Finally, in order to ensure justice for all climatedisplaced persons, the self-determination response must be complemented by a mechanism that will require Northern states to
admit climate-displaced persons who elect to migrate individually, such as the issuance of passports for the territorially dispossessed (modeled on the Nansen passports used by the League of
Nations in the aftermath of World War I) that permit migrants to
become naturalized citizens of the countries to which they relocate.1 90
The self-determination approach recognizes the agency and
creativity of climate-displaced persons rather than reinforcing racialized images that portray them as savages (the national security response), victims (the humanitarian response), or exploitable
workers (the migration management response). If embedded in a
legal framework that imposes obligations on states to accept cli-

188. See Katrina M. Wyman, Limiting the National Right to Exclude. 72 UNIV.
MIAMI L. REV. 425, 453-455 (2017).
189. See Cosmin Corendea, Regionalism, Human Rights and Migration in
Relation to Climate Change, THE CONVERSATION
(February 28, 2018),
http://theconversation.com/regionalism-human-rights-and-migration-in-relation-to-

climate-change-90129.
190. See CLARE HEYWARD & JORGEND ODALEN, A Free Movement Passport for the
Territorially Dispossessed, in CLIMATE JUSTICE IN A NON-IDEAL WORLD (Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser, eds. 2016).
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mate-displaced persons and provide resources for resettlement,
this approach may permit people to shape their own destinies and
transcend the colonial borders that impose immobility and exacerbate climate vulnerability.
The self-determination response challenges traditional notions of sovereignty and calls for a deeper doctrinal and philosophical engagement with the rights of migrants under international law, especially as these intersect with the North's
responsibility for climate change and for the colonial and postcolonial domination of the Global South. In order to implement
the self-determination approach, it is necessary to articulate the
legal and moral obligations of affluent countries to persons displaced by climate change that trigger a duty to provide resettlement assistance, to accept individual migrants, and to facilitate
collective migration. Returning to the life cycle analysis of carbon
capitalism and the Central American case study, the next section
provides a preliminary sketch of an approach to climate displacement that treats migration as a form of reparation.
B. MIGRATION AS REPARATION

A just solution to climate displacement must take into account the responsibility of high-emitting countries for climate
change as well as the need for reparation for the historic and contemporary ravages of racial capitalism. Climate vulnerability is
co-constituted by natural and social processes. As one observer
succinctly points out:
The nature of the wrong here is that the ability of some actors to adapt to climate change is low due to historical legacies of injustice, which would include those of colonial policy
(economic underdevelopment, weak governance structurers,
arbitrary borders, poor infrastructure), Cold War politics
(e.g., destabilizing and/or deposing democratically elected regimes, proxy wars, small arms proliferation), and neoliberal
structural adjustment programs (defunding of the public sector, structurally disadvantageous trade agreements that lock
in underdevelopment).

191

Regrettably, the literature on climate displacement often suffers from environmental determinism-a tendency to neglect the
191. Aaron Saad, Toward a Justice Framework for Understandingand Responding
to Climate Migrationand Displacement. 10 ENVTL. JUST. 98, 100 (2017).
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complex social and economic factors that drive the decision to migrate.1 9 2 Climate law scholars tend to focus on the environmental
factors that trigger displacement-such as rising sea levels, hurricanes, floods, and drought caused by the historic and current
greenhouse gas emissions of the world's most affluent countries.1 93 For example, in a provocative op-ed in the Washington
Post, climate law scholar Michael Gerrard argues that highemitting states should accept climate-displaced persons into their
territory in proportion to each country's historic contribution to
climate change.1 94 Based on carbon dioxide emissions from 1850
to 2011, he concludes that the U.S. would be responsible for resettling 27 percent of climate-displaced persons; "the European Union, 25 percent; China, 11 percent; Russia, 8 percent; and Japan,
4 percent." 195
By contrast, scholars who write on international refugee law
typically emphasize the social, economic, and political drivers of
migration, but do not consider the impacts of climate change. For
example, political scientist James Souter maintains that powerful
states that impose damaging economic policies on other states,
intervene militarily, or support oppressive regimes should have
an obligation to accept as refugees persons whose peril these
powerful states have caused. 196 Granting political asylum is one
way of rectifying the harm. 197 He criticizes refugee law for focusing on the immediate plight of refugees and migrants rather than
the historical circumstances and processes that deprived them of
state protection. 198

192. See FRIEDERIKE GESING ET AL., Introduction, in DENATURALIZING CLIMATE
CHANGE: MIGRATION, MOBILITIES, AND SPACE 5-6 (Friederike Gesing, Johannes Herbeck, and Silja Klepp, eds. 2014), https://www.uni bremen.de/fileadmin/user upload/
sites/artec/Publikationen/artecPaper/200.-paper.pdf.
193. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Climate Change and Human Trafficking After
the ParisAgreement, 22 UNIV. MIAMI L. REV. 345 (2018).
194. Michael B. Gerrard, America Is the Worst Polluter in the History of the World.
We Should Let Climate Change Refugees Settle Here, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/america-is-the-worst-polluter-in-thehistory-of-the-world-we-should-let-climate-change-refugees-resettle-here/2015/06/25

/28a55238-la9c-11e5-ab92-c75ae6ab94b5_story.html.
195. Id.
196. See James Souter, Towards a Theory of Asylum as Reparationfor Past Injus-

tice, 62 POL. STUD. 326, 326-327 (2014).
197. See id.
198. See id. at 327-328.
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Migration law scholar E. Tendaye Achiume echoes these concerns and takes this position one step further, arguing that
Northern states have an obligation to admit so-called "economic
migrants" from the Global South as a form of compensation for
the North's political and economic subordination of the South, including the plunder of land, labor, and natural resources.199 Achiume challenges the notion that economic migrants are "political
strangers" who may be excluded by sovereign states unless they
qualify for refugee status. 2 00 Instead, she contends that the
North's exploitation and domination of the South from the colonial era to the present deprived Southern states and peoples of any
meaningful capacity for self-determination and created an inextricable bond between North and South. 2 01 For example, as Eduardo Galeano observed long ago in connection with U.S. intervention in Latin America, "[i]n the geopolitical concept of
imperialism, Central America is no more than a natural appendage of the United States."2 0 2 Achiume maintains that the North's
exclusion of economic migrants from the South is fundamentally
unjust given the imperial interconnection and interdependence
that binds Northern and Southern states, systematically extracting resources from the latter to benefit the former. 2 03 She concludes that migration (both authorized and unauthorized) in
search of a better life should be regarded as the "personal pursuit
of enhanced self-determination," 2 04 and that economic migrants
should be admitted and included as a matter of "sovereign responsibility for the unequal relations forged by sovereign intervention."205

The combined insights of Gerrard, Souter, and Achiume underscore the importance of integrating the environmental, social,
and economic factors that drive migration in order to avoid envi199. See generally E. Tendayi Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STANF. L.
REV. 1509 (2019).
200. See id. at 1515-1517.
201. See id.
202. Galeano supra note 54.

203. Achiume, supra note 199, at 1521.
204. Tendayi Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STANF. L. REV. 1509, 1522
(2019).
205. E. Tendayi Achiume, The Postcolonial Case for Rethinking Borders, DISSENT
MAGAZINE (Summer 2019), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/the-postcolonialcase-for-rethinking-borders. While Galeano's quote refers specifically to U.S. imperial expansion into Central America in the late nineteenth century, his observations
are equally applicable to contemporary U.S.-Central American relations.
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ronmental determinism and to "situate the historic responsibility
of industrialized countries for global emissions within the wider
context of debates around postcolonial justice, resource distribution and identity."2 06 This integrated framework also disrupts
traditional notions of bounded autonomous sovereign states by
highlighting the contemporary and historic interconnectedness of
states and peoples-political, economic, and ecological. The notion
of states as independent, territorially bounded, and autonomous
entities is particularly problematic in a time of global ecological
crisis because it "undermines the importance of building mutually
supportive relationships that acknowledge the reality of our ecological interdependence."2 0 7 This legal fiction also obscures the
economic and political interconnectedness of states that Achiume
calls neocolonial imperialism. 208
Migration as reparation is consistent with the customary international law obligation to refrain from causing transboundary
harm. 209 The harm in question is the injury to the global commons (the climate system) caused by the greenhouse gas emissions of the world's most affluent states. 0 In addition, as I have
argued in this article, this harm have been compounded by
Northern economic, political, and military interventions that undermine the resilience of the Global South and wreak havoc on
"wages, prices, employment, social services, ... human health,
and access to environmental necessities such as food and wa-

206. See GESING ET AL., supra note 189, at 6.
207. SARA L. SEcK, Moving Beyond the E-Word in the Anthropocene, in THE
EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF LAw: HISTORY, THEORY, POLITICS, 49, 57-58 (Daniel
Margulies et al, eds. 2019).
208. See Achiume, supra note 199, at 1541-1542.
209. See, e.g., PHILLIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2012); Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v.
Can.), 3 UNRIAA 1905 (1941); U.N. Conference on Human Environment, Declaration
of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doe.
A/Conf.48/14[Rev.1, principle 21 (1972); U.N. Conference on Environment and DevelDoc.
opment, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N.
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1), principle 2 (1992); International Court of Justice, The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 226 ICJ REP. 241-42
(1996); Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 ICJ Rep. 1, 45, 1 101
(2010).
210. See generally, Benoit Mayer, State Responsibility and Climate Change Governance: A Light through the Storm, 13 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 539 (2014); Christina
Voigt, State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages, 77 NORDIC J. INTL. L. 1

(2008).
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ter." 21 Indeed, the Central American case study is a compelling
example of the interrelated injustices of climate change and imperial intervention that call for migration as a form of reparation.
Finally, migration as reparation is also consistent with the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), recognized in the 1992 United
on
Climate
Change
Framework
Convention
Nations
12
(UNFCCC).1 The CBDR-RC principle imposes a common obligation on all states to address global environmental degradation
while taking into account each state's contribution to the environmental problem and its ability to prevent, minimize or remedy
the harm. 2 1 3 Consistent with CBDR-RC, the UNFCCC acknowledges "that the largest share of historical and current global
emissions has originated in developed countries," 21 " directs the
Global North to "take the lead in combating climate change and
the adverse effects thereof,"21 " and requires Northern states to
provide financing and technology transfer to the countries of the
Global South. 21" The Paris Agreement, adopted in 2015 under the
auspices of the UNFCCC, reaffirms the principle of CBDR-RC in
article 2(2), and contains references to climate justice and human
rights (including the rights of migrants) in its preamble. 21 ' Thus,
CBDR-RC could be used to justify migration as reparation for
climate displacement.2 18
211. Carmen G. Gonzalez, An Environmental Justice Critique of Comparative Advantage: Indigenous Peoples, Trade Policy, and the Mexican Neoliberal Economic Reforms, 32 U. PENN. J. INT'L L. 723, 787 (2011).
212. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Preamble, art. 3(1), May
9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
213. Sam Adelman, Climate Justice, Loss and Damage and Compensation for
Small Island Developing States, 7 J. HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVNT. 32, 40 (2016).
214. UNFCCC, supra note 212, Preamble.
215. Id., art. 3(1).
216. Id., art. 4(1)(c).
217. Paris Agreement, supra note 139, Preamble, art. 2(2).
218. As noted previously, the Paris Agreement incorporates loss and damage into
the climate regime. See Paris Agreement, supra note 139, art. 8. Loss and damage
consist of harms that cannot be averted through mitigation and adaptation, such as
displacement. See Adelman, supra note 213, at 32. However, the decision adopting
the Paris Agreement specifies that Article 8 "does not involve or provide a basis for
any liability or compensation." G.A. Dec. -/Cp.21, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1
(Dec. 12, 2015). Scholars have noted that this language is contained in an interpretive statement and not in a legally binding provision, and therefore does not foreclose
subsequent agreements on liability and compensation. Furthermore, this interpretive statement does not "alter or waive general rules of customary international law"
including as the no-harm principle. See M.J. Mace and Roda Verheyen, Loss, Damage
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Migration as reparation is one means of fulfilling the aspiration of climate-displaced persons for self-determination and of
providing compensation for climate change and for the North's colonial and post-colonial domination of the South. Affluent countries have an obligation to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions,
to finance climate change adaptation, mitigation and disaster
preparation and response in the Global South, and to take responsibility for the complex and multi-faceted ways that their policies have triggered poverty, violence, and displacement. In the
words of award-winning author and journalist Suketu Mehta:
If the rich countries don't want the poor countries to migrate,
then there's another solution. Pay them what they're owed.
Pay the costs of colonialism, of the wars you imposed on
them, of the inequality you've built into the world order, and
the carbon you've put into the atmosphere. Settle the account, and the creditors will have no reason to come to your
house. Reparations or migration: you choose.... Migration
today is a form of reparations. But the countries that are paying aren't necessarily the ones that are directly linked with
the people they are absorbing; the vast majority of migrants
move from a poor to a less-poor country, not a rich one. Fair
immigration quotas should be based on how much the host
country has ruined other countries.2 19
This article does not contend that migration is a magic bullet
that will address all of the injustices of carbon capitalism. The International Law Commission recognizes three distinct components of reparation: restitution, compensation, and satisfaction. 220
Restitution is designed to restore the situation that existed before
the harm was inflicted.2 21 Migration cannot restore the lands
rendered uninhabitable by climate change or erase the trauma
caused by displacement or by centuries of colonial and postcolonial domination. Where restitution is inadequate or unavailable, compensation can address financially assessable losses.2 22
Migration can play a compensatory role by providing climatedisplaced persons with lands, livelihoods, and resources to faciliand Responsibility after COP21: All Options Open for the ParisAgreement, 25 REV.
EuRo. COMMUNITY AND INT'L ENVTL. L. 197, 205-206 (2016).
219. Mehta, supra note 170, at 208-209.
220. See Int'l Law Comm'n Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10, at 94-95 (2001).
221. See id. at 96.
222. See id. at 98-105.
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tate their mobility as well as valuable intangible benefits such as
pathways to citizenship and the opportunity to reconstitute
themselves on the territory of another state as a self-governing
community. Satisfaction consists of the culpable state's "acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology
or another appropriate modality."2 2 3 Migration as reparation will
provide satisfaction if accompanied by an acknowledgement from
Northern states of their responsibility for climate change and for
the political, economic, and military interventions that impoverished and destabilized the Global South. Northern states are in
dire need of a truth and reconciliation process to promote a public
reckoning with this history. Finally, migration is only one element of a larger package of reforms to provide reparation for the
cradle-to-grave impacts of carbon capitalism, including genocide,
slavery, resource wars, and the "slow violence" of the petrochemical industry. 221

Using Central America as an example, this article lays the
groundwork for future scholarship on migration as reparation by
articulating the moral and legal basis for this demand and by
highlighting the synergies between the work of climate law and
migration law scholars. Regrettably, these bodies of law generally
operate in parallel universes-perpetuating a false dichotomy between environmental and socio-economic problems. One of the
goals of this article is to foster ongoing conversation and collaboration between climate law and migration law scholars, activists,
and policymakers in order to develop just and holistic solutions to
the intersecting social, economic, and ecological crises of our time.

C. RACE, RACISM, AND CROSS-RACIAL SOLIDARITY
From the colonial era to the present, the North's devastating
interventions in the Global South have been justified by a series
of racist ideologies that cast the Global South as inferior, uncivilized, savage, backward, and in need of "modernization" and "de-

&

223. Id. at 105.
224. For scholarship addressing reparations for colonialism and slavery, see Catherine Lu, Colonialism as StructuralInjustice: HistoricalResponsibility and Contemporary Redress, 19 J. POL. PHIL. 261 (2011); see Alfred Brophy, REPARATIONS: PRO
CON (2006); see Ali Mazrui, Global Africa: From Abolitionists to Reparationists, 37
AFR. STUD. REV. 1 (1994); see Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 323 (1987); see also, Caricom
Ten-Point Plan for Reparatory Justice, CARICOM, https://caricom.org/caricom-tenpoint-plan-for-reparatory-justice/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) (outlining a ten-point
plan for reparations for slavery, genocide, and colonialism).
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Racist ideologies are now being deployed to justify

increasingly restrictive border controls-portraying Southern migrants as criminals and invaders who threaten to overwhelm
Northern states.226
A racial capitalist analysis of climate displacement must
identify who benefits from the North's exclusionary migration
policies. The primary beneficiaries are the corporations that operate private immigration prisons, construct border walls, and
provide security and surveillance. 2 A second beneficiary is the
state bureaucracy, whose staff and budget increase in order to
administer the policing, imprisonment, and expulsion of migrants. 228 A third group of beneficiaries consists of businesses
that profit when detained migrants are obligated to provide lowpaid industrial labor similar to that performed by individuals incarcerated for criminal offenses.22 9 A fourth group of beneficiaries
consists of the criminal enterprises that traffic undocumented
migrants and can deploy the threat of detention and deportation
to exert greater control over their victims.2 3 O Finally, the North's
restrictive immigration policies benefit right-wing populist politicians who stoke racialized hostility against migrants and other
people of color to obtain the support of working class Whites for

225. See generally, ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (describing the doctrines that justified the
North's subordination of the Global South, including the doctrine of discovery, terra
nullius, the mandate system, the trusteeship system, modernization, and develop-

ment); see Gonzalez, supra note 55, at 161-163.
226. See Samuel Berhanu Woldemarian, Amy Maguire, and Jason von Meding,
Forced Human Displacement, the Third World and InternationalLaw: A TWAIL Perspective, 20 MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (2019).
227. See BHATTAcHARYYA, supra note 14, at 128-139; CESAR CUAUHTEMOc GARciA
HERNANDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON: AMERICA'S OBSESSION WITH LOCKING UP
IMMIGRANTS, 119-133 (2019).
228. See BHATTACHARYYA, supra note 14, at 129-130.

229. See id. at 138-139; see Shamelle Richards and Devon C. Pefna, An Environmental Justice Critique of CarceralAnti-ecology, in ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL AND
FOOD JUSTICE TOWARD DISMANTLING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 115, 123-126

(Anthony J. Nocella II et al, eds., 2016) (discussing the origins and contemporary operation of the penal labor system).
230. See generally, Stephen Wood, The Intersection of Human Trafficking and Immigration, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL PETRIE-FLOM CENTER, BILL OF HEALTH, (Jun. 27,
2018), http:/Iblog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/27/the-intersection-of-humantrafficking-and-immigration.

442

Loyola Law Review

[Vol. 66

policies that intensify economic inequality and hasten catastrophic climate change.23 1
In his insightful book, Dying of Whiteness, Jonathan Metzl
explains how racism persuades working class Whites to support
policies that are literally killing them and to oppose policies that
would significantly enhance their quality of life-such as gun control, health care reform, stronger social safety nets, and better
environmental protection. 2 32 In an equally thought-provoking
book, sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild explains that working
class Whites in Cancer Alley oppose government regulation of the
petrochemical industry because they feel that the government
has betrayed them and has enabled people of color to "cut in line"
and get ahead at their expense.233
Racialized communities in the sacrifice zones of carbon capitalism and U.S. imperialism are the first to suffer the ravages of
climate change and predatory economic policies that disrupt lives
and livelihoods. Their plight is a harbinger of the harm that will
ultimately befall everyone. Racism creates divisions between
groups of people whose vulnerability to carbon capitalism should
serve as the basis for solidarity. As economic inequality increases
and the planet's ecosystems are brought to the brink of collapse,
all but the very affluent will become frontline communities in an
increasingly damaged and dangerous world. As Achille Mbembe
observes: "Nearly everywhere the political order is reconstituting
itself as a form of organization for death." 234
CONCLUSION
A race-conscious analysis of carbon capitalism has the potential to foster collaboration among scholars in diverse areas of law,
including those who write on climate law, migration law, human
rights law, critical race theory, and economic law. It also has the
potential to unite social justice movements that are often fragmented and compartmentalized, including movements to combat
extractivism, neoliberalism, militarism, police brutality, mass in-

231. See generally JONATHAN M. METZL, DYING OF WHITENESS; HOW THE POLITICS
OF RACIAL RESENTMENT IS KILLING AMERICA'S HEARTLAND (2019); ARLIE RUSSELL
HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE
AMERICAN RIGHT (2018).
232. See generally METZL, supra note 231.
233. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 231.
234. ACHILLE MBEMBE, NECROPOLITICS 7 (2019).
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carceration, mass deportation, economic inequality, and racism.
As Naomi Klein observes:
[T]he anti-austerity people rarely talk about climate change,
the climate change people rarely talk about war or occupations. We rarely make the connection between the guns that
take black lives on the streets of US cities and in police custody and the much larger forces that annihilate so many
black lives on arid land and in precarious boats around the
world.25

The objectification and degradation of humans and nature in
an endless quest for profit is the cross-cutting theme that unites
these struggles. Racism makes injustice acceptable by portraying
large segments of humanity as unworthy, expendable, and disposable. It generates fear and mistrust and creates a wedge between communities that should work in alliance to create a more
just and sustainable world.
As I write these words, the world is in the throes of a coronavirus pandemic and demonstrations against racial injustice, inspired by the murder of George Floyd by police in Minneapolis.236
In the U.S., right-wing populist politicians have weaponized the
COVID-19 pandemic to stoke racism against persons of Asian descent (by referring to COVID-19 as the "Chinese virus") and to
justify the closing of borders and the curtailment of "undesirable"
migration.2 37 Some government officials are urging that older
people and persons with pre-existing medical conditions be sacrificed in order to protect the national economy from the harms occasioned by public health restrictions.2 38 The Black and Latina/o
235. Klein, supra note 48.
236. See Suyin Haynes, As Protesters Shine a Spotlight on Racial Injustice in America, the Reckoning is Going Global, TIME (June 11, 2020), https://time.com/5851879/
racial-injustice-protests-europe/.
237. See Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, Meghan Benton, and Susan Fratzke, Coronavirus Is Spreading across Borders, But It Is Not a Migration Problem, MIGRATION
POL'Y INST. (Mar. 20 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/coronavirus-not-amigration-problem; Kurt Bardella, Trump's "Chinese Virus" Coronavirus Tweets
Echo His Mexico Insults - with Similar Results, NBC NEWS, THINK: OPINION,
ANALYSIS, ESSAYS (Mar. 18, 2020) https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trump-schinese-virus-coronavirus-tweets-echo-his-mexico-insults-ncna1 162261?fbclid=lw

AR3mZ6cq43laAgmrAiD3IrYtgEwg9YWih-qVS2wohGWp36QFokHnxui4CKI.
238. See Katie Shepherd, "I Would rather die than kill the country": The Conservative Chorus Pushing Trump to End Social Distancing, WASH. POST, March 25,
2020; Lois Beckett, Older People Would Rather Die Than Let Covid-19 Harm US
Economy - Texas Official, THE GUARDIAN (Mar, 24, 2020); Noah Millman, The Con-
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communities battered by police brutality, mass incarceration, and
the "slow violence" of polluting industry are experiencing disproportionately high levels of COVID-19 infection and death. 2 39 The
pandemic is intensifying divisions but also creating new alliances
as communities come together to demand universal healthcare,
more robust social safety nets, cancellation of medical and student loan debt, a moratorium on evictions, the dismantling of racist policing, and the release of migrants in detention facilities and
of incarcerated elderly, terminally ill, and non-violent offenders. 2 0 Like the global pandemic, climate change is a cataclysmic
shock that upends daily life, intensifies pre-existing inequities,
and will transform the world as we know it. In order to promote
equitable solutions to the problem of climate displacement, it is
essential to articulate a historically grounded and morally compelling narrative that illuminates the structural injustices of racial capitalism and fosters solidarity among social justice movements.
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